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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal requires us to consider the intersection of 
Rules 4(m) and 12(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in particular whether an objection to service of 
process as untimely under Rule 4(m) may be waived under 
12(h) if not made in compliance with Rule 12(g). 
Surprisingly, it is an issue we have not previously 
addressed. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant John A. McCurdy, Jr., M.D., is a licensed 
physician practicing cosmetic surgery in the State of Hawaii 
through the professional corporation of John A. McCurdy, 
Jr., M.D., FACS, Inc., wholly owned by McCurdy 
(collectively referred to as "McCurdy"). McCurdy filed for 
bankruptcy after a jury awarded a former patient $2 million 
in her malpractice suit against him. Thereafter, on June 10, 
1996, McCurdy filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of Hawaii against the 
American Board of Plastic Surgery ("ABPS") (the appellee 
here), the Hawaii Plastic Surgery Society, the American 
Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc., seven 
individual plastic surgeons, and two professional medical 
corporations. McCurdy alleged unfair competition, unlawful 
restraint of trade and various antitrust violations in the 
field of cosmetic plastic surgery under the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 15 (1994), the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.SS 1-2 
(1994), and Haw. Rev. Stat. S 480-13(a)(1). Among the overt 
acts alleged was the testimony of a California plastic 
surgeon on behalf of the plaintiff in the malpractice suit. 
On October 4, 1996, McCurdy filed an amended complaint, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), naming an additional 
defendant, the American Board of Medical Specialties 
("ABMS"). 
 
The instant appeal involves only defendant ABPS, which 
was served with both the original and amended complaints 
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on October 28, 1996, 20 days after the expiration of the 
original 120-day period provided for under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(m). McCurdy claims that he failed to serve ABPS during 
the 120-day period because counsel had used that time to 
make his Rule 11 inquiry, concluding by October 4, 1996, 
that a factual and legal basis for suit existed. Although 
service had been initially mailed to ABPS on October 4, 
1996, it was directed to William D. Morain, M.D., who was 
no longer employed by ABPS. Consequently, McCurdy re- 
served ABPS on October 24, 1996. This time, service was 
directed to Constance Hanson, an ABPS administrator, who 
accepted it on October 28, 1996. 
 
On January 17, 1997, ABPS moved to dismiss McCurdy's 
claims under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that Hawaii lacked 
personal jurisdiction over it and that venue was improper. 
ABPS did not allege a defect in the October 28 service of 
process pursuant to Rules 12(b)(4) or 12(b)(5). 
 
On January 27, 1997, the Hawaii district court granted 
a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and 
improper venue filed by defendant ABMS. The court 
reasoned that under Hawaii's long-arm statute, Hawaii had 
no jurisdiction over ABMS and that even if it did, 
McCurdy's claims with respect to ABMS were barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
 
McCurdy anticipated that the court would apply the 
same reasoning to ABPS, which like ABMS had been served 
under Hawaii's long-arm statute. Therefore, McCurdy 
sought to moot the issue of personal jurisdiction under the 
state long-arm statute by re-serving ABPS under the 
Clayton Act, which provides that process on a corporate 
defendant "may be served in the district of which it is an 
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." 15 U.S.C. S 22 
(1994). McCurdy believed that the October 4 filing of the 
first amended complaint initiated a new 120-day time 
period in which to serve ABPS, but even that period would 
have expired on February 3, 1997. On February 5, 1997, 
McCurdy filed an ex parte motion requesting the court to 
exercise its discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) to extend 
the 120-day period by nine days. On February 7, 1997, 
while the ex parte motion was pending, the amended 
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complaint was personally served on ABPS. Although the 
first service was designated in counsel's cover letter as 
under the Hawaii long-arm statute, the February service 
was ostensibly under the nationwide service provision of 
the Clayton Act. A week later, the Hawaii magistrate judge 
denied without prejudice McCurdy's ex parte motion to 
enlarge the time in which to serve. On February 27, 1997, 
ABPS moved to quash the February 7, 1997 service on the 
ground that it was untimely under Rule 4(m). The record 
contains no indication of any ruling on that motion. 
 
On April 11, 1997, the Hawaii district court, ruling on 
ABPS's January 17 motion to dismiss, held that it lacked 
personal jurisdiction over ABPS and that venue was 
improper. Nonetheless, the court then transferred 
McCurdy's suit against ABPS to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania "in the interest of justice," as it would have 
otherwise been time-barred as of that time. McCurdy never 
re-served ABPS. 
 
On May 13, 1997, following the transfer, ABPS filed a 
motion to dismiss arguing that the original October 28, 
1996, service was untimely. McCurdy opposed the motion 
and filed a cross-motion for an extension of time to effect 
service. McCurdy argued that ABPS had waived any 
challenges to the timeliness of the October service because 
its motion to dismiss the action in the District of Hawaii 
listed as grounds only lack of personal jurisdiction and 
venue. On November 12, 1997, the Pennsylvania district 
court granted ABPS's motion on the ground that McCurdy 
had failed to effect service within 120 days of either the 
original or first amended complaints. The court read the 
language of Rule 4(m) that requires that service of process 
be made within 120 days to be mandatory, and not subject 
to waiver. Thereafter, the court determined that McCurdy 
had not been diligent in attempting to serve ABPS and 
declined to find good cause for extending the time for 
service. Accordingly, the district court dismissed McCurdy's 
complaint against ABPS. McCurdy now appeals that 
dismissal. 
 
II. 
 
McCurdy argues on appeal that the district court erred in 
determining that failure to effect service in compliance with 
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Rule 4(m) requires dismissal and is not subject to waiver by 
the defendant. He claims that ABPS waived any challenge 
to the October 28 service by not raising it in the Rule 12 
motion filed in Hawaii on January 17, 1997. In that motion, 
ABPS moved to dismiss based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction and venue but not on the ground that service 
had been untimely. Issues concerning the propriety of 
service under Rule 4 are subject to plenary review. See 
Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 
988 F.2d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Rule 12(g) provides that "[i]f a party makes a motion 
under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or 
objection then available to the party which this rule permits 
to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make 
a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g). 
 
The Rule "contemplates the presentation of an omnibus 
pre-answer motion in which defendant advances every 
available Rule 12 defense and objection he may have that 
is assertable by motion." 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d S 1384 at 
726 (1990). Thus, if a defendant seeks dismissal of the 
plaintiff 's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) on the 
ground that service of process was insufficient or 
ineffective, it must include that defense either in its answer 
or together with any other Rule 12 defenses raised in a pre- 
answer motion. See generally 2 James Wm. Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice, S 12.21 (3d ed. 1997). 
 
In turn, Rule 12(h) provides: 
 
       A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, 
       improper venue, insufficiency of process, or 
       insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if 
       omitted from a motion in the circumstances described 
       in subdivision (g), or (B) if it is neither made by motion 
       under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading 
       or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be 
       made as a matter of course. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, if a Rule 12 motion is made and the defendant 
omits its objection to the timeliness or effectiveness of 
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service under Rule 12(b)(5), that objection is waived. This 
court has long recognized that objections to service of 
process are waived if not timely raised. See, e.g., 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Sun Island Car Rentals, 
Inc., 819 F.2d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 1987) (defective service 
waived if not challenged in first defensive pleading); 
Konigsberg v. Shute, 435 F.2d 551, 551-52 (3d Cir. 1970) 
(per curiam) (finding defendant waived right to assert 
defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of 
process where these objections were not raised in first 
responsive pleading); Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 58- 
59 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (deeming defendants' 
objection to service of process waived where defendants 
initially moved to dismiss only on statute of limitations 
grounds). 
 
The courts of appeals in our sister circuits have reached 
the same conclusion. See Armstrong v. Sears, 33 F.3d 182, 
188 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) requires 
consolidation of defenses and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) 
requires that objections to service be included infirst Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12 motion); Golden v. Cox Furniture Mfg. Co., 683 
F.2d 115, 118 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating challenges to service 
of process must be included at time of first Rule 12 
motion); O'Brein v. R.J. O'Brein & Assocs., 998 F.2d 1394, 
1399-1401 (7th Cir. 1993) (party must include defense of 
insufficiency of process in its first Rule 12 motion, or its 
ability to do so is waived); United States v. One 1978 Piper 
Cherokee Aircraft, 91 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(objection to sufficiency of process waived if not made in 
motion pursuant to Rule 12); Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. 
Co., 902 F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that 
insufficiency of process defense is waiveable); cf. RTC v. 
Starkey, 41 F.3d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming 
district court's denial of motion for leave to file motion to 
dismiss where defendant waived insufficiency of process by 
failing to raise it in answer). 
 
On its face, the language of Rule 4(m) appears to be 
inconsistent with Rule 12's waiver scheme. It provides that 
where service is not effected on a defendant within 120 
days of the filing of the complaint, the court"upon motion 
or on its own initiative . . . shall dismiss the action without 
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prejudice as to that defendant." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The 
district court here concluded that an objection to the 
timeliness of service was governed by the "clear, mandatory 
time requirements set forth in the Rule," so that Rule 4(m) 
effectively overrides the waiver provisions of Rule 12(h). See 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 5 n.2. Though an arguably plausible 
resolution, courts and commentators addressing the 
apparent tension between Rules 4(m) and 12(h) have 
unanimously concluded that Rule 4(m) does not trump 
Rule 12(h) and that an objection that service is untimely 
under Rule 4(m) is subject to waiver by the defendant if not 
made in compliance with Rule 12. See 4A Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d S 1137 at 81 (Supp. 
1998) ("the mandatory-sounding language of Rule 4(m), 
stating that a court `shall dismiss' an action if service is not 
effected within 120 days, does not affect waiver under Rule 
12(h)(1)(B) if a defendant files a responsive pleading that 
omits insufficiency of service as a defense"); Starkey, 41 
F.3d at 1021 (objections to untimely service are waiveable 
pursuant to Rule 12 notwithstanding Rule 4's mandatory 
language); Pusey v. Dallas Corp., 938 F.2d 498, 500-01 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (failure to include defense of untimely service of 
process in pre-answer motion waived defense under Rule 
12(h)); Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313, 1317- 
18 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); Kersh v. Derozier, 851 F.2d 
1509, 1511-12 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying Rule 12 waiver 
provision to defense that service was perfected within 120 
days of filing the complaint); United States v. Gluklick, 801 
F.2d 834, 836-37 (6th Cir. 1986) (same). 
 
We agree that Rule 12 "purports to have universal 
application, and we see no reason to deviate from its plain 
language." Kersh, 851 F.2d at 1512. One court has 
commented that to hold otherwise "would lead to the 
indefensible proposition" that a defendant, who voluntarily 
waives an objection to a Rule 4(j) (now Rule 4(m)) violation, 
can be precluded from doing so by a requirement that the 
court dismiss the action. Pardizi, 896 F.2d at 1316-17 n.2. 
Once it is recognized that the mandatory language of Rule 
4(m) is applicable until occurrence of one of the 
circumstances covered by Rule 12(h), which governs 
thereafter, any facial tension between the two rules is 
avoided. We hold, therefore, that a defense that service of 
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process was untimely under Rule 4(m) is subject to Rule 
12's waiver provisions and may be waived if not raised in 
compliance with that rule. Accordingly, ABPS waived its 
objection to the timeliness of the October 28, 1996, service 
when it omitted that defense from its January 17, 1997, 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(2), and for improper venue pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(3). 
 
Our conclusion that ABPS waived its objection to the 
October 28, 1996, service as untimely does not end our 
inquiry. The question remains, wholly apart from 
McCurdy's failure to comply with Rule 4(m) with respect to 
the October 28 service, whether either of McCurdy's 
attempts at service on ABPS was effective. ABPS argues 
that the original service made pursuant to the Hawaii long- 
arm provision was ineffective because the district court in 
Hawaii lacked personal jurisdiction over it. We agree. 
 
Under Hawaii law, a defendant served pursuant to the 
state's long-arm provision must be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Hawaii courts. See Haw. Rev. Stat. S 634- 
35 (1996). Given the determination of the district court in 
Hawaii that it lacked personal jurisdiction over ABPS, it 
necessarily follows that the October 28, 1996, service made 
pursuant to Hawaii law did not effectively invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Hawaii court. Therefore, once the case 
was transferred, McCurdy was required to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania court by re-serving ABPS 
with service issued by that court. 
 
In a similar situation in Buggs v. Ehrnschwender, 968 
F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1992), plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen 
who was injured in an automobile accident in New York, 
sued a New York citizen in a federal court in Pennsylvania 
and served defendant by certified mail. The case was 
transferred to the federal court in New York and was 
dismissed for improper service. The court noted that the 
service of the complaint before transfer of the case was 
ineffective because defendant had insufficient contacts to 
fall within Pennsylvania's long-arm statute. Therefore, 
plaintiff "was obligated to effect service in the new forum" 
following the transfer and his failure to do so before the 
statute of limitations ran resulted in dismissal. Id. at 1548; 
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see also 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil 2d S 1353 at 279 (1990) ("service of process is . . . the 
means by which a court gives notice to defendant and 
asserts jurisdiction over him") (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Pennsylvania court, McCurdy was required to timely re- 
serve ABPS in Pennsylvania, which he failed to do. 
 
Finally, we note that, having objected pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(2) on the ground that Hawaii lacked personal 
jurisdiction over it, ABPS effectively preserved the defense 
that the October 28, 1996, service of process was 
insufficient on the ground that personal jurisdiction was 
lacking. ABPS was not required to make the identical 
objection twice -- once under Rule 12(b)(2) and again under 
Rule 12(b)(5). Where personal jurisdiction is lacking, 
"[c]learly, a Rule 12(b)(2) motion . . .[is] more appropriate" 
than one under Rule 12(b)(5). 5A Wright & Miller, S 1353 at 
278-79. 
 
We turn then to consider the possible effectiveness of 
McCurdy's February 7, 1997, service under the Clayton 
Act. McCurdy concedes that the February 1997 service was 
untimely by four days. In fact, he further concedes that if 
his first attempt at service was ineffective, then his filing of 
the amended complaint would not have commenced a new 
120-day time period in which to perfect service. See 
Appellants' Br. at 17. Thus, the 120-day period, which 
commenced on June 10, 1996, expired on October 8, 1996, 
and McCurdy's second attempt at service was four months, 
as opposed to four days, late. 
 
With this in mind, we examine whether the district court 
properly refused to grant McCurdy an extension of time in 
which to serve nunc pro tunc.1  We review the district court's 
denial of McCurdy's cross-motion for an extension of time 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note initially that ABPS's objection to the timeliness of the 
February service was not waived by its failure to include the objection in 
its January 17, 1997, motion to dismiss. At the time ABPS filed its 
motion to dismiss, the second service had not yet been attempted. Thus, 
the objection was not available as of the time the motion was filed. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) (requiring that a defendant's Rule 12 motion include 
all Rule 12 defenses "then available"). 
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to serve for abuse of discretion. See Boley v. Kaymark, 123 
F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
This court has developed a two-pronged inquiry to 
determine whether the grant of an extension of time in 
which to serve is proper under Rule 4(m). First, the court 
must determine whether good cause exists for the failure to 
have effected service in a timely manner. If so, the 
extension must be granted. If good cause has not been 
shown, however, the court still may grant the extension in 
the sound exercise of its discretion. See MCI Telecomm. 
Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1098 (3d Cir. 
1995); Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 
1305 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
In the case at bar, the district court found that 
McCurdy's efforts at perfecting timely service had been 
"half-hearted and dilatory." Dist. Ct. Order at 7. It 
concluded therefore that good cause for the delay had not 
been shown. Id. Moving to the next step of the analysis, the 
court recognized that the statute of limitations had run on 
McCurdy's claims against ABPS thus barring the refiling of 
his complaint. Nevertheless, the court insightfully 
commented that "the running of the statute on the date the 
original complaint was filed causes me to view that factor in 
a light less favorable to plaintiff than might otherwise be 
the case." Id. at 8. In the end, the court characterized 
McCurdy's attempts at service as "too little, too late" and 
concluded that he had demonstrated no basis to justify the 
exercise of the court's discretion to grant an extension of 
time in which to serve. Id. 
 
Our own review of the record satisfies us that the district 
court did not err in refusing to grant the extension that 
McCurdy sought. None of McCurdy's attempts at service 
was timely. Nor at any time did McCurdy ask any court for 
an extension of time before the time allotted under the 
Rules had lapsed. As the district court stated,"once the 
matter was transferred to [Pennsylvania], counsel did not 
even attempt to move to extend the deadline for service 
until after the defendant moved to dismiss." Id. at 6. 
Indeed, at the time the district court ruled, the statute of 
limitations on McCurdy's claims had expired almost 
eighteen months prior. We are well aware that the Federal 
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Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote 
justice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Often that will mean that 
courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits 
whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the 
merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in 
a timely fashion so that the defendant is not forced to 
defend against stale claims. Here, McCurdy failed to do just 
that at every opportunity, and the district court was well 
within its authority to deny McCurdy the extension he 
sought. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons stated above, the order of the district 
court dismissing McCurdy's complaint will be affirmed. 
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